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Economic models of trade in endangered species products often do not incorporate four focal
arguments in the policy debate over trade bans: 1) law-abiding consumers may operate in another
market, separate from illegal consumers, that trade would bring online; 2) legal trade reduces
stigma, which affects demand of law-abiding consumers; 3) laundering may bring illegal goods
to legal markets when trade is allowed; 4) legal sales may affect illegal supply costs. This paper
analyzes systematically which aspects of these complicated markets, separately or in combination,
are important for determining whether limited legalized trade in otherwise illegal goods can be
helpful for achieving policy goals like reducing poaching.
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iiiThe Complex Interactions of Markets for
Endangered Species Products
Carolyn Fischer0
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The question of whether to sell conﬁscated endangered species products, such as ivory, generated
a great deal of debate at the 11th Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in April 2000. An experiment authorized by CITES allowed three
southern African countries to sell some of their stockpiles of captured ivory in 1999. Accounts of
the effects on poaching of this limited legalized trade have reported mixed evidence. According
to the Environmental Investigation Agency, a nongovernmental group based in the United King-
dom, elephant poaching increased with the sales (Thornton et al., 2000). According to the United
Nations, the legal sales, which raised $5 million intended for elephant protection and community
development, did not elicit a poaching response (Greenwire, 2000). According to simple economic
theory, however, poaching should have decreased.
Traditional economic theory says that selling conﬁscated goods should unambiguously lower
prices by satisfying consumer demand. These lower prices mean the gains from poaching must
be smaller, leading to reductions in that activity. Prohibiting conﬁscated goods from being sold,
on the other hand, increases scarcity and drives up prices. In some cases, enforcement can then
actually increase poaching, as poachers raise their total catch to ensure enough of the unconﬁscated
share gets through to the market and the higher prices (Bergstrom, 1990). A key assumption is that
illegallyproduced goods and legally soldconﬁscated goods are interchangeable, perfect substitutes
in a single market. In reality, though, separate legal and illegal markets can exist, and arbitrage
between them may not be perfect. In other words, while consumers in the illegal market may care
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only about price, as in the traditional model, law-abiding consumers also care about the source of
the product.
Anecdotal evidence of the experience with these products suggests that the legal and illegal
markets are intertwined in complex manners. For example, many consumers of ivory may prefer
their purchase to have been obtained legally and without harm to the species. Thus, not only will
law-abiding consumers refuse to purchase from the black market, but their preferences may further
depend on aggregate consumption of legal and illegal stocks, not just their own consumption of
the good. Consequently, a higher proportion of legal trade can raise their willingness to pay, while
more poaching or more illegal trade can lower it. Legalizing trade may then raise overall demand.
Meanwhile, more legal trade can lower the odds of being caught in an illegal exchange, affecting
prices and incentives in the illegal market. Finally, the legal supply may be intrinsically tied to the
illegal supply, as in the case of selling conﬁscated products obtained from poaching.
As a result of these complex interactions, loosening restrictions on legal supply or tightening
enforcement for illegal transactions could have ambiguous or unexpected effects. Thus, it is im-
portant to understand the nature of the markets for the illegal product to determine the best policy
response. Interactions can occur on both the demand and the supply sides of dual markets, and the
type and extent of these interactions vary for different products.
On one side are demand externalities, which we refer to as “stigma” and “outrage”. Stigma
derives from the perception that the product was obtained through illegal or inhumane means; the
impact of stigma on utility then depends on how much the consumer cares about that perception
in order to enjoy the product. This kind of stigma is more important for display goods, like ivory
or diamonds, than consumed goods, like medicinal uses of rhino horn. Stigma depends on the
relative sizes of the illegal and legal markets; outrage, on the other hand, depends on the absolute
size of the illegal activity. Outrage has some roots in altruism or existence value, since personal
enjoyment of the good is reduced by the scope of the harmful behavior, regardless of whether one’s
own purchase was obtained in a lawful or cruelty-free manner.
On the supply side, interactions can arise in the form of cost externalities. For example, the3
relative size and scope of the legal market could affect smuggling costs. Both demand and supply
sides can also interact through arbitrage. Arbitrage occurs when law-ignoring consumers cross
into the legal market to buy goods, or when launderers make illegally supplied goods available
in the legal market. These latter costs may also be affected by legal market activity, besides just
enforcement.
Most previous studies assume a single market exists, in effect imposing perfect arbitrage. Some
exceptions deal with individual aspects of these complexities but ignore the interactions that may
occur when they are considered together. Heltberg (2001) recognizes that international consumer
d e m a n dm a ys h i f ti nas w i t c hf r o mf r e et r a d et oat rade ban regime, but he does not model separate
types of markets with limited legal trade. Barbier and Swanson (1990) examine the major sources
of demand for ivory and consider the effect of limited legal sales, but they do not formalize the
market interactions. They focus primarily on raising ivory values for elephant conservation efforts
and funds for enforcement, rather than on depressing the return to poaching. Bulte and van Kooten
(1999) consider separate domestic and international markets for ivory, the former not being subject
to the trade ban and the latter displaying perfectly elastic demand. However, their model does
not capture the complexities of stigma externalities or nonconsumptive use values. Another long
economics literature exists on competition among imperfect substitutes. Again, consumers are
assumed to participate in both markets and to care only about product prices, while production of
each product proceeds independently (except in imperfect competition).
The purpose of this paper is to think through systematically which aspects of these complicated
markets are important for determining whether limited trade in illegal goods is helpful for achiev-
ing policy goals like reducing poaching. Four main characteristics peculiar to these markets are
considered, both separately and together:
1. Law-abiding consumers may operate in another market, separate from illegal consumers,
that certiﬁed trade would introduce.
2. Stigma may affect demand of law-abiding consumers, and legal trade reduces stigma.4
3. Laundering may bring illegal goods to legal markets when trade is allowed.
4. Legal sales may affect illegal supply costs.
We develop a theoretical economic model taking dual markets, demand externalities, and en-
dogenous production costs into consideration. We explore how different opportunities for arbitrage
and different market interactions affect the scope of illegal behavior and the effectiveness of con-
ﬁscation and resale policies. Section 2 presents the analytical model of dual markets with stigma
goods. Section 3 analyzes the case of one-way demand-side arbitrage. Section 4 subsequently
adds laundering and supply-side externalities. Section 5 uses simple functional forms to solve the
model numerically and explore the effects of the different market assumptions on how conﬁscation
rates affect poaching, consumption and welfare. Although the model used in this paper is static,
it serves as a useful foundation for analyzing renewable resource problems as well. A dynamic
component of a resource stock response could be added to consider long-run effects.1
The results indicate that separate demand by law-abiding consumers is not a problem in itself
forpoaching. Whenlimitedtradeisallowed, unconﬁscatedpoachedmaterialsremainillegaltosell;
thus, in the dual markets model, black markets continue to operate. Since illegal consumers will
change their behavior only if prices in the legal market fall below black market prices, legal trade
either depresses prices (and thereby poaching incentives) on the black market or has no impact.
Stigma effects do not change this result, except that selling all available certiﬁed products may not
minimize the international price. For trade to be problematic to poaching, legal demand must be
tied to legal supply, either through arbitrage opportunities like laundering or through externalties
with respect to poaching costs. Laundering opportunities to bring illegal goods fraudulently to
legal markets can bid up illegal prices if legal demand is higher.
1For example, interacting markets with stigma could change the optimal strategy found by Kremer and Morcom
(2000) regarding enforcement and sales for open-access resources producing storable goods.5
2D u a l M a r k e t s M o d e l
We assume that two types of markets exist for endangered species products, which for the sake
of brevity and example we will refer to as ivory. Consumers are separated into two types: law-
abiding consumers (denoted by subscript L), whowill onlypurchase certiﬁedproducts (denoted by
superscript c), and noncompliant consumers (denoted by subscript N), who do not care about the
products’ origin and are willing to buy uncertiﬁed products (denoted by superscript u). Suppliers
are represented by poachers in the illegal market and a government or enforcement agency in the
certiﬁed goods market. We assume, at least for now, that certiﬁed products can be distinguished
from uncertiﬁed ones. Later, we will introduce laundering as a means to bring uncertiﬁed goods to
supply the legal market.
Let us deﬁne the following variables:
Qc
L Consumption of certiﬁed products by law-abiding consumers
Qc
N Consumption of certiﬁed products by noncompliant consumers
Qu Consumption of uncertiﬁed products by noncompliant consumers
QN Total consumption by noncompliant consumers
Sc Total availability of certiﬁed products
Su Total availability of uncertiﬁed products
K Total amount of goods produced through poaching (killing)
H Total amount of goods produced through harvesting




Illegal supply, Su, equals the quantity of animals poached and not consﬁscated: Su = φK.T h e
cost of poaching, C(K), is assumed to be increasing and convex in the catch. Poachers maximize6
proﬁts with respect to the quantity of animals caught, given the price on illegal markets, the cost










Thus, if half of poached goods are conﬁscated, the poacher requires twice the price to catch a given
amount (as opposed to producing a given amount).
2.1.2 Legal Supply
Legal supply, Sc, is composed of legal harvesting and of materials conﬁscated from poachers. Le-
galharvesting, H, canbefromanimalsthatdiedofnaturalcausesorfromactivefarming(whichwe
may add later in a dynamic model). Conﬁscated goods are a linear function of total poaching and
of enforcement effort (1 − φ),w h e r eφ is the fraction of poached goods that escape enforcement.
The conﬁscation rate is exogenous to the market actors, set by the government. The government
collects conﬁscated and harvested products and can choose how much of this stock to sell. The
constraint on legal supply is then
S
c ≤ H +( 1− φ)K.7
The chosen amount is auctioned (or otherwise efﬁciently allocated), and in equilibrium, total con-







Thus, legal supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, and production costs are irrelevant
at this point; effectively, the government is assumed to conduct enforcement and choose auction
quantities for reasons other than proﬁt maximization. Later we may endogenize legal supply by
considering the planner’s decision, such as to minimize poaching or to maximize welfare.
2.2 Demand
2.2.1 Law-Abiding Consumers
L a w - a b i d i n gc o n s u m e r sw o r r ya b o u ts t i g m at h a tm a yb ea t t a c h e dt ot h e i rc o n s u m p t i o n . T h e y
may also care about the health of the elephant population. Let us represent the utility of the
legal consumer as the function V (Qc
L,σ,K). Marginal utility from own consumption is positive
and diminishing: V1 ≥ 0; V11 < 0. Since stigma derives from the perception that the product
was obtained through illegal or inhumane means,2 we will assume this negative perception is an
increasing funtion of σ,t h ef r a c t i o no ft h et o t a lm a r k e tt h a ti si llegal. Thus, for endangered species
products and like goods, utility is decreasing in σ: V2 < 0; V12 < 0. (On the other hand, for goods
like guns, marginal utility maybe increasing in thefraction of the sales goingtoillegal consumers.)
The strength of stigma effects can depend on whether the good is used publicly or consumed
privately, but we assume in all cases that if no legal market exists, law-abiding consumers will not
buy anything at any price: V1(0,1,K) ≤ 0. Finally, consumers may enjoy their product more if
the population stock, net of poaching, is higher; alternatively, poaching activity and the associated
horrors may increase stigma effects. We will call this third term “outrage” and assume utility is
2We assume that the consumer knows her type and knows that the product was obtained in a legal transaction;
however, others do not know her type, only the odds of the product being purchased legally. The impact of stigma on
utility then depends on how much the consumer cares about that perception in order to enjoy the product.8
decreasing with total poaching: V3 < 0; V13 < 0.
















Stigma is an increasing function of illegal supply and a decreasing function of legal supply; we




With no illegal market, σ =0 . Under a trade ban, σ =1 .L e tγ = H/K. In an equilibrium with
no sales of conﬁscated goods, with only harvested goods being certiﬁed, σ = φ/(φ + γ).I fa l l
conﬁscated goods are sold as well, σ = φ/(1 + γ). Without harvesting and with only conﬁscated
goods to sell, σ = φ.
We assume for now that the stigma variable does not affect supply; that is, the costs of bringing
illegal goods to market are unaffected by the availability of certiﬁed products. The total legal
supply affects only the stigma of consuming endangered species products. This assumption allows
us to consider the implications of demand-side market interactions.
T h ee f f e c to fs t i g m ai st os h i f tl e g a ld e m a nd. Given any level of stigma, one can consider
demand by law-abiding consumers to be downward sloping in a typical form. However, a fall in
stigmashiftsthatdemandupward(−V12 > 0). Thus, givenanylevelofpoachingandillegalsupply,
the effect of a change in certiﬁed sales causes both an upward shift in demand and a downward
movement along the demand curve as consumption increases. The net effect on willingness to9
pay depends on the relative strength of the stigma effect. Effectively, then, the legal demand
curve facing the policymaker may be downward sloping, upward sloping, or nonmonotonic. The
following ﬁgure illustrates the case where stigma effects initially dominate but decline as sales
increase and satiation becomes more important.



















Noncompliant or “illegal” consumers are assumedt ob ei m p e r v i o u st os t i g m ao ro u t r a g e .T h e i r
utility arises solely from their total ivory consumption U(QN). They may purchase Qc
N from legal
markets and Qu through illegal channels (the subscript can be ignored because they are the only











The resulting ﬁrst-order conditions lead to three possible outcomes:
Q
c






















Since noncompliant consumers are indifferent to the source of the product—whether it was
obtained legally or illegally—and therefore will buy whichever product is cheaper. If the price on
illegal markets is higher, they will purchase in legal markets. If the price in legal markets is higher,
they will resort to illegal markets. If demand is not satisﬁed fully by one market or another, then
arbitrage implies equal prices for certiﬁed ivory and for contraband. Under what circumstances
can each of these market equilibria occur and what do they imply for the effectiveness of trade
bans for protecting endangered species?
3 One-Way Arbitrage
Some supporters of the trade ban for ivory and other endangered species products argue, in part,
that by reducing the stigma of ivory consumption, legal sales of seizures spur more demand.
Whether this translates into more illegal behavior, however, depends critically on the type and
availability of arbitrage opportunities between the legal and illegal markets. We will show that if
the following conditions hold,
1. demand-side arbitrage opportunities are unidirectional (illegal consumers will shop in both
markets but law-abiding consumers will not);
2. illegal suppliers cannot arbitrage between markets (they can sell only to noncompliant con-
sumers); and
3. illegal supply costs are unaffected by legal sales;
then
• a trade ban maximizes poaching;
• selling all harvested and conﬁscated goods may not minimize poaching; and11
• increasing enforcement may have ambiguous effects on poaching in all cases, even with full
resale of conﬁscated goods.
To demonstrate those results, we now return to th et h r e ep o s s i b l et y p e so fm a r k e te q u i l i b r i a
with trade and compare them with the trade ban scenario.
3.1 Trade Ban
In this case, no legal market exists. Consumption and supply of certiﬁed products are zero, and
noncompliant demand is satisﬁed by illegal supply. In the notation, Qc
L + Qc
N = Sc =0and




Let Kban be the level of poaching activity that solves this equation. Figure 2 depicts the market
equilibrium when only the illegal market is active. Kban is determined where the marginal cost of
poaching, including the tax of conﬁscation, equals the price per successfully sold unit. Actual ille-
gal supply, φKban, is the portion of the goods poached at that price that remain after conﬁscation.
This illustration uses a conﬁscation rate of about 1/2.
As in the Bergstrom model without resale of conﬁscated goods, greater enforcement may ac-
tually increase total poaching if the price increase outpaces the additional conﬁscation. Totally
differentiating (6) and solving, we get the change in equilibrium poaching due to a small increase








The denominator is clearly positive, but the numerator is of ambiguous sign. Rewriting, wesee that
the result depends on whether the elasticity of demand in the illegal market (ηu = −(U0/U00)/Qu)12
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Thus, if demand is inelastic, greater enforcement increases poaching, since the price increase more
than compensates for the additional conﬁscation. If demand is elastic, greater enforcement reduces
poaching.













Figure 3 portrays a change from a conﬁscation rate of 1/2 to 2/3, which shifts the supply curve
from the inelastic portion of the demand curve. As a result, while illegal consumption falls to
φ
0K0
ban, total poaching increases to K0
ban.
Notethatifthismarketweretheonlyone(asinthe Bergstrommodel), apolicyofresellingcon-
ﬁscated goods would drive the price down to where poaching supply intersects demand: Pu
resell =







C00 − φU00 < 0.
This result will no longer hold with certainty when we introduce separate markets and stigma
effects.
3.2 Single Legal Market
In an equilibrium where only the legal market is active, we have Qc
L+Qc
N = Sc and Qu =0 .I fn o
one buys poached materials, then K =0 ; no poaching then implies no conﬁscation and Sc = H.
In other words, legal harvesting must fully satisfy both markets. From the ﬁrst-order conditions












This situation canoccur if expropri a t i o nisv e r yh ig ho rc o m p le te( φ =0 ), or if residual demand
after legal harvests are sold is very low—that is, below the threshold for poaching: C0(0)/φ.F i g u r e
4 depicts this case. Decreasing Sc necessarily raises prices: it lowers the marginal utility from
direct consumption and does not affect stigma, as long as all products are still legal. In terms of
the picture, decreasing sales from H would shift the kink in the supply curve left and drive up the14
price. If the production threshold price is reached, poaching begins. A trade ban in this situation,
then, necessarily increases poaching.











Increasing enforcement has no effect, since no poaching is taking place. Decreasing enforce-
ment, all else equal, could induce poaching if the after-conﬁs c a t i o nr e t u r ni sr a i s e da b o v et h e
threshold.
The value of H relative to demand is obviously important here, as it determines whether sufﬁ-
cient returns to poaching exist. In a dynamic model, the stock of elephants will affect both H and
poaching costs. Brown and Layton (2001) note that sales from an initial stockpile can drive out
poaching in the short term. However, in the long run, sustainable harvesting must both be sufﬁcient
to satisfy demand and also not correspond to a herd size so plentiful that poaching is easy enough
to be worthwhile. Although the government may want to harvest optimally, poachers follow the
laws of the commons and do not consider their effect on herd dynamics. Thus, in thinking ahead
toward a model of optimal harvesting, we need to recongnize equations (8) and (9) as constraints,
in addition to the biological response functions. These interesting additional complications will be
saved for later exploration.15
3.3 Separate Legal and Illegal Markets
In an equilibrium where both markets are active but separate, we have Qc
L = Sc ≤ H +(1−φ)K,
Qc
N =0 ,a n dQu = Su = φK.F r o m t h e ﬁrst-order conditions for consumers and producers









Since this latter condition is identical to that under a trade ban, the equilibrium amount of
poaching is also equal to trade ban level Kban. Any policy that raises prices in the legal market
would have no effect on poaching, as the illegal market is satisﬁed by current poaching levels and
higher prices in the legal market would not affect demand by noncompliant consumers. Poaching
will be affected only by changes in the amounts legally auctioned if the result is to lower prices
in the certiﬁed market below those in the illegal markets. At that point, illegal consumers will
arbitrage and the markets will be pushed into the next category of perfect arbitrage. The net effect
will be to reduce poaching byl o w e r i n gt h er e t u r n .
The direction of impact on prices in t h el e g a lm a r k e to fac h a n g ei nc e r t i ﬁed sales depends on
therelative strengthofthestigma effect. Givenany quantity oflegal sales, whichdeterminestigma,
marginal utility is always declining. However, each level of sales corresponds to a different level of
stigma, which shifts the marginal utility curve. The legal demand curves pictured are the result of
theequilibriumcombinationsofpriceandquantities, giventhecorrespondingstigma. Thequestion
is whether the direct effects of more legal consumption on the marginal utility of the law-abiding
consumer are dominated by indirect utility (shifting) effects of stigma: V11 >? < −V12dσ/dSc.
That determines whether the effective legal demand curve is downward or upward sloping.16
In either case, starting from a point where the markets are separate, a trade ban does nothing to
illegal markets, and thereby does not affect poaching. A change in legal sales will affect welfare
through consumption, but it will not affect poaching unless a regime switch occurs. And in that
case, it can only reduce poaching.
Although trade policy in this model can affect illegal behavior only indirectly through equi-
librium effects with the legal market, enforcement policy affects the illegal market directly. The
equilibriumsupply effects of enforcement then also affect legal demand. HoldingSc ﬁxed, increas-
ing enforcement effort tends to raise prices in both markets: the marginal costs of illegal supply
rise, as does the willingness to pay by law-abiding consumers, because of a fall in stigma. Unless
the contraction in the illegal market causes prices to rise even higher than in the legal market, the
effect of increased enforcement will be identical to that in the trade ban case.
If we sell all harvested and conﬁscated goods (Sc =( 1−φ)K+H), an increase in enforcement
may depress the legal price, due to increased consumption, but the effects on poaching remain the
same. As long as the markets remain separate, the impact on poaching supply depends strictly
on the elasticity of demand in the illegal market. Meanwhile, a fall in poaching raises consumer
surplus and marginal utility in the legal market. However, should the illegal market prices rise to
the level of the legal market, the regime will switch to one of arbitrage.
3.4 Perfect Arbitrage
Thus far, a trade ban either increases poaching or has no effect. Therefore, the only situation in
which trade restrictions might help protect species is if noncompliant consumers arbitrage between
certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed product markets. Under perfect arbitrage, Qc
L + Qc
N = Sc,a n dQu =
Su = φK. Combining the ﬁrst-order conditions for consumers and producers (equations (2), (5),








L + φK); (12)17

























Let us call the resulting equilibrium level of poaching (given Sc and φ) Karb.
We know that Karb <K ban,s i n c eU0(φKban) represents an upper bound on the price in the
illegal market. If law-abiding consumers demand more than is legally available at that price, the
price of certiﬁed goods would be driven up and the two markets would remain separate. However,
if law-abiding consumers do not soak up the entire legal supply at that price, prices would have
to fall, as would the return to poaching. In other words, since the arbitrage can occur only in one
d i r e c t i o n ,i tc a no n l yd r i v ed o w nt h ep r i c e si nt h eillegal market compared with no trade, not raise
them. Therefore, under no conditions can a full ban on trade reduce the level of poaching in this
model.18
3.4.1 Sales Policy
Still, with stigma effects, the relationship between poaching and legal sales may not be monotonic.
The level of legal sales that would minimize poaching is that which minimizes prices and maxi-
mizes Qc
N.







V11 + U00 > 0 (14)
Increasing legal sales unambiguously raises legal consumption, since it reduces stigma and the
supply shift lowers prices. The impact on illegal consumption will depend on the direction of price
change in the legal market.
Let us write Pc = V1(Sc − Qc
N,φK/(φK + Sc),K). Holding Qc
N and K constant,
∂Pc
∂Sc = V11 − V12
σ
φK + Sc > 0? (15)
The sign depends on whether the stigma effect at that point is greater or less than the direct effect
on marginal utility; that is, if the movement along the demand curve dominates the shifting up.
In equilibrium, part of the incidence of this change will be borne by illegal consumers and part
through changes in poaching. If Pc goes down, illegal consumers will shift away from uncertiﬁed
goods toward certiﬁed ones, stemming some of the price fall; meanwhile the return to poaching
will fall. Poaching changes in this case have an attenuating effect on the impact of additional
sales—stigma and outrage effects will raise willingness to pay if poaching decreases, and lower it
if poaching increases. However, in equilibrium, the shift cannot completely crowd out the initial
price change, else there would be no change in poaching to generate the shift in the ﬁrst place.
Therefore, to understand the direction of the effect on poaching, it is sufﬁcient to consider the
partial effects of a small change in sales, holding all else constant.
The policy prescription then depends on the shape of effective legal demand.19
Strictly Declining Demand. If effective legal demand declines monotonically with legal con-
sumption, then maximizing sales minimizes the price. Selling all harvested and conﬁscated goods













Strictly Increasing Demand. If effective legal demand increases monotonically with legal con-
sumption, then the price is minimized when no certiﬁed products are sold to law-abiding con-
sumers. This distinction is important: some certiﬁe ds a l e sm u s to c c u r ,e l s ew ew o u l dn o tb ei na
perfect arbitrage equilibrium. As will soon be illustrated, these sales serve to drive down the price











Nonmonotonic, Concave Demand. If effective legal demand is strictly concave, then the price
is minimized at min{Pc
all,Pc
none}. Let us illustrate this result.
FromFigure5, wesawthatwhenlegal demandisnonmonotonic, thelegalpricecouldbedriven
down below the trade ban price in two ways. First, one could sell a lot of certiﬁed products and
saturate the market, but this would require a large source of harvested goods. Second, one could
dramatically cutbackcertiﬁedsalestoanamountthatraisesstigma, drivingdownlegalconsumers’
willingness to pay, while satisfying more illegal consumer demand and lowering prices.
The intuition for the latter case is that, when stigma effects are initially strong, for very small
Sc the illegal consumers have a higher marginal willingness to pay. Rather than dropping to the
legal demand level, the price for certiﬁed goods follows along the illegal demand curve, as those
consumers arbitrage. The difﬁculties of portraying a dual-market equilibrium become evident
here. The effective legal demand curve incorporates stigma effects from additional certiﬁed sales.
However, as equilibrium prices fall, K contracts, which shifts the legal demand curve upward20
through changing stigma and outrage effects.
























In Figure 6, the gray lines portray the trade ban equilibrium. If certiﬁed sales rise above the
level Sc
switch, the markets remain separate. Below this level, because of to greater stigma, law-
abiding consumers’ willingness to pay lies below the trade ban price. If the certiﬁed price falls,
illegal consumers will buy some of the certiﬁed products, driving down the illegal price. The
corresponding reduction in poaching shifts up legal demand; at any level of legal consumption,
both outrage and stigma will be lower. The black legal demand curve depicts the equilibrium at
which the arbitrage price is lowest. If any more than Sc
none of certiﬁe di v o r yi sm a d ea v a i l a b l e ,
law-abiding consumers will bid up the price. If any less is sold, illegal consumers will bid up the
price.
Following the other end of the demand curve, we see that the same price could be achieved
with a large amount of certiﬁed sales. However, for the harvesting supply shown in the picture,
this level of sales would not be feasible.21
Nonmonotonic, Nonconcave Demand. Interior minima are possible with nonmonotonic de-
mand curves that are convex over some range. This would mean the relative effects of stigma
become stronger as it falls, at least over some range. At the minimum price, some certiﬁed goods
would be consumed by law-abiders, but not all available certiﬁed products would be sold.
Those last three cases, in which something less than full resale might minimize poaching, exist
only because of stigma effects. In all cases, however, some level of certiﬁed sales occurs and is
preferred to a trade ban.
3.4.2 Conﬁscation Policy
Note that while greater enforcement raises the poaching and supply curves, it also shifts up legal
demand, which causes the kink in the effective demand curve to shift upward as well. If certiﬁed
sales are held constant, tighter enforcement may or may not dampen poaching, as seen with the
trade ban case. An increase in enforcement not only reduces illegal supply but also shifts up legal
demand through lower stigma; both effects unambiguously reduce illegal consumption and raise
prices. As in the single illegal market case, depending on the elasticity of the (effective) demand
(including stigma effects), this price increase can more than offset the cost increases.
Outrage also has an attenuating effect on the impact of additional enforcement—it will raise
willingness to pay only if enforcement actually decreases poaching. As before, additional enforce-
ment contracts illegal supply, whichr a i s e sp r i c e si nt h ei l l e g a lm a r k e ta n d ,b ya r b i t r a g e ,i nt h el e g a l
market. In this case, holding Sc ﬁxed, the reduction in illegal supply reduces stigma, which raises
willingness to pay by lawful consumers. As before,i ta l s ol o w e r st h er e t u rn to poaching. Then the
question is whether the higher prices in the illegal market outweigh the additional costs of bringing
uncertiﬁed products to market. Whether selling these additionally conﬁscated goods mitigates the
price effects of reducing illegal supply depends on the previously analyzed demand parameters.
Unlike the trade ban case, the effects of greater enforcement may now also be ambiguous even
when all conﬁscated goods are resold, because of the impact of stigma. Consider a policy of full
resale, as in (16). Then stigma is proportional to the share of poached products that escape con-22
ﬁscation: σall = φ/(1 + H/K). Without a stigma effect, increasing enforcement unambiguously
reduces poaching, since reselling the additional conﬁscations keeps demand low while costs rise
(as in the Bergstrom model). However, raising enforcement now also reduces stigma and shifts up
demand, making the net impact on price (and poaching) dependent on the strength of the stigma
effect, as well as the regular demand elasticities of legal and illegal consumers.
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Figure 7 portrays an example where an increase in the conﬁscation rate (decrease in φ)g e n -
erates an outward shift in demand from reduced stigma that just outweighs the upward shift in
poaching supply costs. Thus, the degree of the stigma effect plays an important role for enforce-
ment decisions in a perfect arbitrage equilibrium.23
4 Two-Way Arbitrage
4.1 Laundering
In the preceding cases, with only stigma effects, we saw that a trade ban could never reduce poach-
i n gc o m p a r e dw i t har e g i m ew i t hs a l e so fc o n ﬁscated and harvested products, although selling all
available certiﬁed products might not be optimal. However, these results may change if we relax
t h ea s s u m p t i o n st h a ta r b i t r a g ei su nidirectional or that illegal costs are unaffected by legal market
behavior. By allowing legal consumption to affect the supply of endangered species products, or
vice-versa, trade policy can have ambiguous effects.
This reverse link between the markets can arise in different ways. The very existence of a
certiﬁcation process makes counterfeiting possible. Thus, laundering can bring poached goods to
the certiﬁed market.
S u p p o s ew eh a v ei n t e r m e d i a r i e sw h oa r ew i l l i n g to buy black-market goods and launder them
for fraudulent sale in legal markets. We then must allow for another type of enforcement, (1−φ
f),
the rate of conﬁscation of laundered products. We assume that the more laundering is performed,
Qf, the greater the costs of doing so, F(Qf),w h e r eF0(Qf) > 0, F00(Qf) ≥ 0 for Qf > 0.( T h u s
we assume for now that laundering costs are unaffectedby the size of the legal market.) Launderers














Thus, if no price differential exists and the illegal consumers are doing the arbitrage, no laundering
will occur, because excess supply in the legal market is satisfying demand in the illegal market.
On the other hand, when the market equilibrium involves separation, laundering offers a vehicle24
to use illegal supplies to satisfy excess demand among legal consumers. Laundering cannot occur
under a trade ban, nor is it worthwhile when both t y p e so fc o n s u m e r so p e r a t ew i t h i nas i n g l el e g a l
market. Therefore, we will focus on circumstances where this form of arbitrage is active.
Since the relevant case requires Pc >P u, we know that Qc







f ≤ H +( 1− φ)K + Q
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u = φK − φ
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f ≥ 0
where 0 <S c ≤ H + θK + θ
fQf.F r o mt h eﬁrst-order conditions for consumers and producers,
we have
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Two types of solutions result when this arbitrage is present. One is a separating equilibrium
where illegal consumers buy at lower black-market prices, and part of the legal market is fed by
fraudulently certiﬁed products. The other is when demand in the market for certiﬁed products is so
strong, illegal consumers are crowded out completely, as intermediaries can get higher prices by
laundering the goods.
We maintain the assumption that stigma is represented by the odds of the product being ob-
tained illegally, which is unaffected by laundering: σ = φK/(Sc + φK).25
4.1.1 Imperfect Arbitrage
We call this “imperfect arbitrage” since a cost is incurred bringing illegally obtained goods to legal
markets. Bothmarkets are active, andthe price inone affects thatintheother, althoughtheyremain
separate. In this equilibrium, we get the same condition as in equation (22), as well as (20). The
effect of greater sales or enforcement displays the same direction as in the previous case, although
the magnitude will differ, since some of the incidence is borne by changes in illegal demand.
Thus, if the market parameters are such that laundering occurs, a trade ban will reduce poach-
ing. These conditions imply that marginal utility in legal markets is greater than in illegal ones
(V1(Sc,φ/(φ+Sc/Kban),K ban) >U 0(Kban)), enough to justifyl a u n d e r i n g ,w h i c hd r i v e su pp r i c e s
in the illegal market and thereby the incentive to poach.
4.1.2 Single “Legal” Market
In the previous single legal market case, illegal consumers could ﬁnd cheaper access to goods in
legal markets. In this case, a single market occurs because values are so much higher in the market
for certiﬁed goods, that launderers resell everything. If the illegal market is crowded out, then











Furthermore, it must be that V1 − F0(φK)/φ
f >U 0(0).
Selling more certiﬁed products then has an impact on the level of poaching depending on the
relative effects of consumption versus stigma. If stigma dominates, prices rise, as do poaching and
laundering. If satiation dominates, prices fall, as do illegal activities. By deﬁnition, a trade ban
would reduce poaching, since C0(K)/φ >U 0(0) >U 0(φKban).






























Figure 8 depicts what such an equilibrium would look like when all conﬁscated products are
sold. The certiﬁed price is that at which legal demand equals total supply K. That supply is
determined by the price in the illegal market. Furthermore, at the corresponding price differential,
the entire poached supply remaining after conﬁscation is laundered, of which φ
fQf gets through
while the remainder is resold. Laundering has driven the illegal market price above the intercept
of the illegal demand curve.
4.1.3 Conﬁscation Policy
The effect of increased enforcement against poaching in a market with laundering would be to
raise poaching costs and lower stigma. Theoretically, the direction of impact on poaching could
be ambiguous, as it was in the perfect arbitrage equilibrium (without laundering). In this case,
with complete laundering leading to a single “legal” market, illegal consumers do not change
t h e i rc o n s u m p t i o na sp r i c e sc h a n g e .S i n c ew en e e d not concern ourselves with the incidence on
illegal consumers, the results can be shown more easily mathematically. Consider the full-resale
equilibrium with no harvesting and complete laundering, as in (23). Totally differentiating, we get27









f − V11 − V13
.
Althoughthedenominatorispositive, thenumeratorisofambiguoussign, sinceenforcementraises
poaching costs but lowers laundering and its costs and lowers stigma.3
Greater enforcement of laundering, on the other hand, would raise those costs and unambigu-








f − V11 − V12 − V13
< 0.
This result is similar to that of the Bergstrom model with resale. GivenK, a change in enforcement
of laundering merely reduces the share of sales that are laundered, leaving stigma and consumption
unaffected. Inequilibrium, then, lesslaunderingmeanslesspoaching. Thepriceincidencedepends
on the consumption and stigma effects.
However, if the fraudulent goods that are conﬁscated are not resold, the impact of greater en-










fV11 − σ(1 − σ)V12/K − V13
.
The intuition is similar to that in the trade ban case without resale, where the price elasticity of
demand is a key factor.
3A similar but messier result is achieved holding certiﬁed sales ﬁxed. One would expect this case to be more likely
to yield a counterproductive effect, since certiﬁed prices are likely to rise more in the absence of reselling additional







fKV11 − σ(1 − σ)V12
C00 + φ(φF00/φ
f − φφ
fV11 − σ(1 − σ)V12/K − V13)
.28
4.2 Supply Externalities
A concern with allowing legal trade is that it may cause illegal costs to fall, possibly by making
enforcement less effective, given any level of effort. However, if such connections exist, they do
not necessarily lend support to the trade ban argument. In fact, it is important exactly what form
the externality takes. Do thicker legal markets
1. make enforcement less effective?
2. make poaching cheaper?
3. lower marginal costs of laundering?
4. lower the conﬁscation rate for laundering?
The discussion will reveal that
• an externality that reduces enforcement effectiveness can have ambiguous effects on poach-
ing; and
• an externality that lowers direct poaching costs may affect the optimal scope of trade, but it
does not necessarily follow that a trade ban minimizes poaching.
If expanding the legal market makes enforcement more difﬁcult, the effect will be similar
to lowering the conﬁscation rate, which has already been shown to have ambiguous effects on
overall poaching in several cases. The intuition is that lowering the conﬁscation rate lowers the
illegal supply curve disproportionately compared with the poaching supply curve, since not only
do average returns per kill rise, but also fewer kills need to be made to supply the same amount of
goods to the market. Since the illegal supply curve falls more with the lower conﬁscation rate, the
equilibrium price will be lower, given an equivalent shift in the poaching supply curve. Thus, the
price may fall enough to mitigate the impact of the cost reduction on poaching. This result for the
trade ban case was given in equation (7).29
If, on the other hand, the externality affects pre-conﬁscation poaching costs, then legal trade
is more likely to increase the proﬁt to poaching. The reason is that lower poaching costs lower
both the illegal supply and the poaching supply curves proportionately; the ratio remains the same
because the number of kills to supply a given amount to market remains the same. Consider the
trade ban case where U0(φK)=aC0(K)/φ,w i t ha being a cost-shift parameter. A negative cost







2U00 > 0. (24)
With laundering, similar differences exists between lower laundering costs or less conﬁscation.
If all conﬁscations are resold, decreased enforcement or lower costs will increase poaching. If cer-
tiﬁed sales are ﬁxed, a decrease in laundering conﬁscations could have ambiguous effects. Lower
laundering costs would still increase poaching.
However, the presence of cost externalities does not necessarily imply that a trade ban mini-
mizes poaching. The action that creates the cost-lowering effect (more legal sales) also tends to
lower prices. Ifstigma effectsfromthelegalsalesare strong, thenpartoftheincidence of increased
laundering will be to push up stigma and mitigate any price increase.
Thus, the question of whether to sell additional certiﬁe dg o o d si sw h e t h e rt h ep r i c e - l o w e r i n g
effect outweighs the externality effect. With stigma, it was whether satiation outweighed the shift
in demand. Here, the question is whether any negative net impact on the price is outweighed by
the shift in supply.
5 Enforcement Policy and Poaching
Since poaching activity is typically the variable of most interest to policymakers, we would like to
understand how equilibrium poaching reacts to policy changes. To solve for equilibrium poaching
activity, we must specify functional forms for demand and supply. To explore further the effects
of dual markets and stigma on the impact of enforcement, consider the following simple example30
using linear supply and demand curves.
Let illegal (inverse) demand be linear of the following form: PN = y − QN. Law-abiding
consumers have linear demand in the absence of a ban, but QL =0under a ban. Their demand is
assumed to be either identical to that of noncompliant consumers or adjusted by a stigma factor.
Let marginal poaching costs also be linear: C0(K)=cK, leading to the (inverse) poaching supply
curve PS = cK/φ.
Now we solve for equilibrium poaching in four cases. No trade ban in a scenario means that
the remaining illegal supply (φK ) is not restricted to illegal consumption.
Trade 1: An equilibrium with just illegal consumers and all conﬁscations resold.
Trade 2: An equilibrium with both markets and all conﬁscations resold, but where legal con-
sumers are identical to illegal ones. In other words, there is no trade ban and no stigma
effect, but antipoaching policy remains. Note that this case represents a single market (as in
traditional models); allowing for separated legal and illegal markets would lead to equilib-
rium poaching of min{Kban,K 2}.
Ban: A trade ban equilibrium.
Trade σ: A no-ban, perfect arbitrage equilibrium with stigma and all conﬁscations resold. This
case again represents a single market. Allowingf o rs e p a r a t e dl e g a la n di l l e g a lm a r k e t s ,t h e
resulting equilibrium would be max{min{Kσ,K ban},K 1}.
The following table summarizes the functional form assumptions and equilibrium values for
the different scenarios.
Scenario Ban Legal Demand Price Eq. (PS) Supply Eq. Poaching
Trade 1 No NA PN QN = KK 1 =
yφ
c+φ
Trade 2 No PN = y − QL PN = PL QN + QL = KK 2 =
2yφ
2c+φ
Ban Yes NA PN QN = φKK ban =
yφ
c+φ2
Trade σ4 No PL = b(1 − φ)y − QL PN and/or PL QN + QL = KK σ =
(1+b(1−φ))yφ
2c+φ
4This scenario has corner solutions. PS = PN = PL,f o rQL > 0 and QN > 0;a n dPS = PN for QL =0 ,a n d31
Figure 9 depicts an example where y =1 0 , b =2and c = .5 (or half the slope of the demand
curves). With the trade ban, we see that for smaller conﬁscation rates, increasing enforcement ac-
tually increases equilibrium poaching. Not until conﬁscation becomes more complete is poaching
actually reduced.5 Without stigma effects, a resale policy implies that increases in enforcement
always lead to less poaching, as is evident in both trade cases 1 and 2.
Figure 9: Poaching and Enforcement
Poaching
Confiscation Rate









The horizontal line shows that a ban alone (without enforcement) is more effective than a full-
tradepolicy, uptofairlyhighlevelsof conﬁscation, sinceitimmediatelyeliminatesthe law-abiding
half of the market. A combination of ban and legal resale would follow the minimum of the ban
and full trade poaching. The smaller is the law-abiding portion of the market (of which Trade 1 is
the limit), the sooner can an enforcement policy with resale reduce poaching.
Stigma produces interesting effects. As mode l e dh e r e ,s t i g m ai ss oh i g hf o rl o wl e v e l so f
conﬁscation, lawfulconsumersareoutbidbyillegalconsumersfortheresoldgoods. Thus, initially,
thearbitragepathfollowsTrade1untilapositiveequilibriumquantitygeneratedinthelegalmarket
(around (1−φ)=0 .2 in this example). But only for higher conﬁscation rates is more enforcement
PS = PL for QN =0 . The equation for Kσ represents the interior solution.
5In this case, until φ = c,o rc/m for other linear demand functions with slope m.32
effective at reducing poaching, and at that point, the effect of falling stigma makes it harder to
reduce poaching.
Figure 10: Consumer Welfare and Enforcement
Consumer Surplus
Confiscation Rate












Poaching, however, may not be the only variable policymakers are concerned with. Restricting
trade also has other implications, including forgone enjoyment of the products (consumer surplus),
enforcement costs, and changing producer costs (although we may tend to sympathize less with
the last). As an illustration, Figure 10 displays the combined consumer surplus of the previous
example.
A trade ban is always worst for consumers, and more so at higher conﬁscation rates, when it
performs worse at reducing poaching compared with trade scenarios. Welfare is always higher
and poaching lower when conﬁscated goods are resold on illegal markets (the traditional single
market example). When stigma is irrelevant, welfare steadily declines with enforcement, reﬂecting
the consumption decline. However, when stigma is a factor, welfare can rise with enforcement
(although so may equilibrium poaching). The kinks in that curve reﬂect switching from and to
corner solutions. First, stigma is so high that all goods are bought by illegal consumers; then,
perfect arbitrage occurs; ﬁnally, stigma falls so low that legal consumers drive the illegal ones out
of the market. The consumer welfare-maximizing conﬁscation rate is positive but less than 1 when
stigma is important (here roughly 65%).33
Adding laundering results in equilibria much like the no-ban scenarios Trade 2 and Trade σ.
Both consumer types have almost full access to the overall market, although the costs to legal con-
sumers are slightly higher because of laundering costs. Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the effects of
laundering and enforcement on consumption and poaching, for the cases without and with stigma,
respectively.
Figure 11: Enforcement and Laundering without Stigma


















The presence of laundering, in the absence of stigma, ensures that poaching returns are strictly
declining with the conﬁscation rate. With or without laundering, however, a trade ban alone may
be more effective than conﬁscation until the rate is relatively high.
Figure 12: Enforcement, Laundering and Stigma





















No Laundering With Laundering
With our form of declining stigma, laundering becomes less signiﬁcant for enforcement pol-34
icy, as the price differential appears only when stigma is relatively low, which occurs only when
enforcement rates are relatively high.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Traditional, single market models for endangered species products suggest that sales of conﬁscated
and legally harvested goods help reduce incentivesfor poaching. The analyticalmodel inthispaper
shows that incorporating more complex interactions between markets for endangered species prod-
ucts can lead to results that contradict those earlier models. However, not all the interactions that
concern trade ban proponents imply that limited sales of certiﬁed products encourage poaching.
In the absense of laundering, poaching is still greatest under a trade ban. However, unlike the
traditional model, selling all conﬁscated and harvested goods may not minimize poaching; given
some level of certiﬁed sales, additional legal sales may have an ambiguous effect on poaching if
stigma effects are important. In the traditional model, a full resale policy for conﬁscated goods
ensures that tighter enforcement reduces poaching. However, with separate markets, resale does
not satisfy illegal demand, making the effect of greater conﬁscation ambiguous, depending on
the elasticity of demand. If illegal consumers arbitrage between markets under a resale policy,
increased enforcement may again have ambiguous effects, now depending on the extent of the
stigma effects.
On the other hand, if laundering will always be present, the least poaching occurs under a trade
ban. This result requires not only that fraud be possible, but also that the lowest attainable price in
the legal market (given legal supplies) remain above the trade ban price in the illegal market.
When the policy goal is simply to minimize poaching, the intuition behind the “To ban, or
not to ban?” question depends on the characteristics of the markets. If demand from law-abiding
consumers is relatively big and laundering can and would occur, an enforceable ban on trade would
minimize poaching. However, if laundering can be eliminated, allowing certiﬁed sales would do
no worse than a ban with respect to poaching, while welfare would be higher. If the bulk of demand35
comes from noncompliant consumers and if laundering would generally not occur, then allowing
sales of certiﬁed goods would tend to lower prices and encourage a return to poaching.
Stigma can play an important role, but it does not imply that some certiﬁed sales are necessarily
counterproductive for poaching policy. Stigma ﬁgures into the ban question because it affects the
relative size of legal demand. A trade ban is more likely to be needed when stigma effects (as
modeled here) are weak and lawful demand is strong. If stigma is initially strong and little affected
by small amounts of certiﬁed sales, a limited resale policy can help drive down prices in the illegal
market. However, full resale may not minimize poaching; changes in stigma can be important for
determining the optimal amount of trade.
Similarly, supply externalities may affect the extent of legalized trade that is desirable, but their
presence does not necessarily make a trade ban preferable. If legalized sales make enforcement
more difﬁcult, the effect on poaching can be ambiguous, just like the effect of changes in the
conﬁscation rate. If certiﬁed sales make poaching itself easier, that effect must be weighed against
the price-decreasing effect, perhaps leading to fewer sales rather than no sales at the optimum. If
laundering would occur and certiﬁed sales would make it cheaper, that would indeed reinforce the
case for a trade ban.
Thepolicygoalmaynot simplyfocusonpoaching, however. Iftheg oa li stom ax im i zew e lf a re ,
determining optimal policy is even more complex. Restricting trade has a welfare cost, albeit
a complicated one to evaluate if stigma is strong. Another question raised by stigma effects is
whether they can be manipulated. For products with malleable demand, publicity campaigns—
such as “Just say no”6 or “I’d rather go naked than wear fur”7—could be important policy tools.
By reducing law-abiding consumer demand, one could make sales policy more effective at driving
down the return to poaching.
Appropriate trade and enforcement policy for endangered species products (or dual market
products more generally) thus requires a reasonable sense of the different demand and supply pa-
rameters. For example, if lawful demand for rhino horn is low and most consumers are indifferent
6Nancy Reagan’s campaign against drug use.
7People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals’ campaign against fur.36
to certiﬁcation, the trade ban is likely to be ineffectual in reducing demand, and selling conﬁscated
products would bring down prices, primarily by increasing supply to illegal consumers. If ivory,
on the other hand, is in large demand by law-abiding consumers with a strong sense of stigma,
sales of some but perhaps not all the available stock may help reduce the return to poaching.
An essential research need is to understand better these demand variables according to the
products in questions. Unfortunately, such an endeavor can be tricky, given the inherent lack of
good data for black-market sales.
For species applications, a dynamic model that endogenizes the harvest and poaching variables
according to the resource stock can add more richness to the analysis of the supply side as well.
Although adding a biological response function will inﬂuence equilibrium levels of poaching and
prices, the underlying market fundamentals studied here will remain.
Finally, the complications created by separate markets for stigma-related or regulated goods
are not restricted to ivory and other endangered species products (like rhino horn, tiger bones, and
turtle shells). The model could be adapted to analyze many other products, including “blood”
diamonds from war-torn areas; GMO-free, cruelty-free or organic products; certiﬁed, sustainably
harvested timber; drugs; and guns.
For diamonds, the application of the current model is quite direct, involving both stigma and
laundering. Final demand is from lawful consumers and is large enough to make a ban an unlikely
policy, although differentiating that demand through certiﬁcation is possible. However, to the
extent that some will pay a premium for certiﬁed non-blood diamonds, openings for fraud will
translate some of this differential into higher prices for all diamonds, including those from war-
torn areas. If consumers realize that laundering occurs, stigma may inﬂuence market prices.
Several of the other examples share the complex interactions of dual markets, but the demand
externalities or the supply interdependence may be quite different. For example, for endangered
species products, the legal supply is tied in part to the illegal supply, as in the case of selling
products conﬁscated from poachers. However, in the case of guns, the illegal supply might instead
be a function of the legal supply, if some guns that are initially sold legally subsequently get37
stolen, resold or otherwise diverted into the unregulated market. The stigma of gun ownership may
also be reversed; legal consumers may get more utility from gun ownership the larger the illegal
m a r k e ti s ,a sar e s p o n s et om o r ec r i m i n a l s ’o w n i n g guns. Judging from the res u l t si nt h i sm o d e l ,
understanding these kinds of real interactions will be critical to evaluating the effects of banning
or restricting sales of many kinds of products that are societally problematic.38
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